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Space for the informal tourism economy

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ABSTRACT

In developing countries, many informal economy service providers obtain their livelihoods from tourism, and occupy and share public spaces to do so. As such, these actors must develop 'rules in use' that allow them to work alongside other providers, both formal and informal, in these shared spaces. These actors engage in coopetition, a mix of cooperation and competition, with each other. This paper provides a case study of informal sector service providers in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, to examine how these actors access resources and interact. Snowball sampling was adopted to identify actors and 47 in-depth interviews with pedicab drivers and street vendors were conducted and supplemented with naturalistic observation. Results indicate the public spaces occupied by the informal sector may be classified as common pool resources, collective goods, or semi-private goods. Further, the interaction among the actors in these public spaces is based on the types of, and capacity in, providing goods and services, and trust generated from the actors' interactions. This research identified the formal and informal 'rules in use' that govern the behaviours of the actors related to the use of spaces. Suggestions for how informal economy actors can manage such spaces to enhance their livelihoods are provided.

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1. Introduction

In less developed and developing countries, informal economy actors commonly provide services to tourists: for example, the street vendors who cluster around tourist coaches to sell food, and beach boys who seek to befriend tourists as guides (Bah & Goodwin, 2003). The income from these activities benefits the local community (Cukier, 2002; Cukier-Snow & Wall, 1993; Dahles & Prabawa, 2013), particularly during an economic crisis, when working in the informal economy is a survival strategy for some (Bhowmik, 2005; Brata, 2010; Onodugo, Ezeadichie, Onwuneme, & Anosike, 2016; Tamukamoyo, 2009). For instance, in Peru, the informal economy provides work for around two-thirds of population in urban areas (Martínez, Short, & Estrada, 2017). Such informal activities may also become iconic attractions associated with a destination (Kermath & Thomas, 1992) and a key part of the destination's tourism product, as illustrated in tourism contexts as diverse as

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Chichicastenango in Guatemala, Otavalo in Ecuador, and Malioboro in Yogyakarta-Indonesia.

Local government laws regulate the rights of informal actors to access and work in urban public spaces such as squares and streets near tourist attractions (Bhowmik, 2005; Yeo & Heng, 2014). Essentially, such urban areas are considered as 'collective pool resources where the space remains a public good but access for individual gain is seen to have wider social value and is collectively managed' (Brown, 2015, p. 246). Therefore, laws are enacted to delineate and regulate the space available to informal economy actors (Boonjubun, 2017; Bromley & Mackie, 2009; Onodugo et al., 2016; Taylor & Song, 2016), to reduce problems such as pollution, crime (Brown, Lyons, & Dankoco, 2010), and congestion as illustrated in Bangkok where street vendors activities crowd the pavement and streets (Boonjubun, 2017).

The discourses of use of urban space by the informal economy are dominated by a formal regulation or legalism perspective (Bhowmik, 2005; Boonjubun, 2017; Bromley & Mackie, 2009; Brown, 2015; Taylor & Song, 2016; Yeo & Heng, 2014). In this perspective, urban space is a public space managed by government for the well-being of the all inhabitants. However, this perspective might not be applicable in the urban space occupied by the informal economy where these actors may predominate and may claim a right over particular locations (Brown, 2015; Onodugo et al., 2016; Pietrus, 2015). Limitations in urban space that informal economy actors are allowed to occupy leads these actors to compete to gain access to or control that space available to them (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016; Cross, 1998), as illustrated in Mexico City and the inner city of Johannesburg where street vendors compete for market zones/trading space.

Furthermore, in these urban spaces, informal tourism economy actors are co-located with others informal actors, formal actors, visitors, and urban inhabitants, and must continuously interact and work alongside them. These repetitive interactions have been found to lead to the development of institutions and associated 'rules in use' that serve to regulate behaviours among the actors in the informal tourism economy (Damayanti, Scott, & Ruhanen, 2017; Jütting, Drechsler, Bartsch, & Soysa, 2007; Peña, 2000). Given the importance of urban public space for the welfare of a local community in general and for actors in the informal tourism economy in particular, this research aims to explore spatial interactions among informal economy actors and the rules which govern them. These rules include formal regulations and informal institutions (norms) that coexist in the context of informal economy (Jütting et al., 2007; Peña, 2000).

The prior discourse of informal institutions is based on social exchange theory and considers that norms can regulate exchange processes in individual or group interactions as well as eliminate conflict over fairness among the actors (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1987; Häuberer, 2011). However, the social exchange theory focuses on dyadic or network interactions independent of a particular location such as an urban space examined here. Urban space is a shared resource which influences the behaviours of its actors and is not considered in social exchange theory. Instead, this research applies the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework as it provides a comprehensive approach specifically tailored to examine how shared resources such as urban space are effectively managed.

The IAD Framework was developed from and applied in various disciplines such as politics, economics, social psychology, and geography to explore how institutions affect individual behaviours (Ostrom, 2009), how institutions operate (Coleman & Steed, 2009; McGinnis,

2011), and in response to existing institutional studies founded on individual disciplines that were dominated by market-focused economics, such as contracts among actors in the formal economy (Eriksson, 2008; Zineldin, 2004), and politics that were focused on hierarchies (Ostrom, 2005a). At the core of the IAD framework is the action situation/interaction, defined as a social space where two or more actors interact and exchange resources or compete/fight in gaining resources to perform a task (Ostrom, 2005b, 2011). This study considers urban public space as a physical resource shared by various actors.

This study employs a qualitative case study method to examine the interactions of informal economy actors, both pedicab drivers and street vendors in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Yogyakarta was chosen as the context for this research because this city is one of the main tourist destinations in Indonesia, and a significant informal tourism economy exists in this destination (Dahles & Bras, 1999; Hampton, 2003; Timothy & Wall, 1997; van Gemert, van Genugten, & Dahles, 1999). Data were collected using semi-structured interviews, naturalistic observation, as well as document analysis.

2. Institutional analysis and development framework

The IAD framework provides an approach to analyse action situations (the interaction between two or more actors to exchange and/or compete for resources) and the resulting governance arrangements. Ostrom's IAD framework was developed as a way to create rules in use (essentially governance arrangements) for effective common pool resource management. A common pool resource is one that is owned (effectively) by everyone (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994); a tourism destination is an example of a common pool resource (Briassoulis, 2015; Dodds, 2010; Foster & Iaione, 2015; Huybers & Bennett, 2003). Ostrom described governance arrangements as 'the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive structured interactions' and are 'shared understandings by participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions or outcomes are required, prohibited, or permitted' (Ostrom, 2005b, pp. 3, 18). Such governance arrangements can be formal or informal.

The IAD framework seeks to identify the factors that determine actors' decisions and behaviours in terms of their interaction with the other actors, as well as their concerns about a particular situation. However, the core of the IAD framework is an action situation which is influenced by external and internal factors including biophysical conditions, attributes of community, and rules in use. 'Biophysical conditions' refer to the nature of shared resources among the actors. The shared resources can be public goods, private goods, toll/club goods, and/or common pool resources (see Table 1). 'Attributes of community' refers to the characteristics of the interacting actors. 'Rules in use' define the actions, behaviours, or outcomes that are necessary, prohibited, or allowed among the actors. These rules in use might include formal regulation (defined by the government) and informal institutions (common understandings within the community) (Ostrom, 2005b, 2011).

Table 1. Four basic types of goods

		Sub-tractability of use	
Difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries		Low	High
	Low	Toll (club/collective) goods	Private goods
	High	Public goods	Common pool resources

Source: Adapted from Ostrom (2005b, p. 24).

The IAD Framework has been used widely to explore issues related to the management of common pool resources, such as in forestry (Gibson, McKean, & Ostrom, 2000), geothermal energy (Shah & Niles, 2016), irrigation systems (Lam, 2006), coastal and marine ecosystem (Li, van den Brink, & Woltjer, 2016), and watershed management (Hardy & Koontz, 2010). In the context of tourism, the framework has been applied to the implementation of community-based tourism (Heenehan et al., 2015; Ruiz-Ballesteros & Brondizio, 2013), understanding norms in sustainable tourism (Schroeder & Sproule-Jones, 2012), and the exploration of coopetitive behaviours among informal tourism economy actors (Damayanti et al., 2017).

2.1 Coopetition as a form of actors' interactions

The concept of coopetition is adopted here to explore the interactions among the informal economy in a common pool resource. The concept of coopetition originated in game theory, where competition with others is considered as a zero-sum game and cooperation as a positive-sum game that emphasizes mutual benefits (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995; Padula & Dagnino, 2007; Palmer, 2000). Coopetition is a variable-positive-sum game that presents mutual gain, but does not necessarily bestow fair benefits on actors (Dagnino & Padula, 2002). Coopetition is a complex strategy as the actors have to cooperate without ignoring their own interest, and compete without eliminating their competitors (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996).

Coopetition has also been studied based on the relationships between the actors involved in competitive and cooperative activities. Coopetition is present when cooperation and competition simultaneously occur among two or more actors (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000, 2014; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) although there are different interpretations of 'simultaneous'. Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) consider that two or more actors cooperate to create a new value of the product(s), and compete with other actors in sharing the value of the product(s). Thus, cooperation and competition occur simultaneously but between different groups of actors. Other scholars (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Galvagno & Garraffo, 2010; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Luo, 2004; Walley, 2007) consider that coopetition involves the same actors who compete and cooperate at the same time.

A previous study of coopetition in the informal tourism economy discussed two patterns of coopetition based on the occurrence of cooperation and competition activities (Damayanti et al., 2017). Actors were found to perform sequential coopetition when they share a single shared resource such as customers. The actors compete in gaining customers however in some circumstances, due to their lack of capacity, they need to cooperate with others. They were also found to have simultaneous coopetition when they shared multiple resources such as space, time, and customers. These actors compete in gaining customers while at the same time cooperate in maintaining the ambiance in the space where they interact.

3. Methodology

This study utilises two qualitative case studies (pedicab drivers and street vendors in Yogyakarta, Indonesia), in order to explore the significance of shared urban space for informal tourism economy actors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). The Ostrom's IAD Framework

was applied as the guidance in the analysis. Firstly, we explore one of external factors in the IAD Framework, i.e. 'the attributes of community'/actors that are represented by pedicab drivers and street vendors in Yogyakarta. This exploration includes the types of services or products sold, history, location of business, and the characteristics of both individual and group of actors, later it is called as union. Secondly, we identified 'action situations' as the core of IAD Framework. The action situations in this study are defined as the (economic and non-economic) activities when the actors in the informal economy interact with the others, including the formal actors in this destination. The interactions occur as those actors are co-located in a particular urban space. For instance, interaction between two co-located pedicab drivers who try to gain a visitor as their passengers or between two co-located street vendors who try to sell their similar products to a potential buyer. In the last step, we identified two external factors in the IAD framework, i.e. the characteristics of space as 'biophysical conditions' as well as 'the rules in use' that govern the behaviours of the actors in this destination. In this identification, we asked the actors to identify the location (space) of their interactions as well as the rules in use in this location including formal and informal institutions, such as who has the right to use the location, the obligation and right of each actor in this space, and the one who defined these rules. The answers of these questions determined the sub-tractability of use and difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries of the urban space. These two aspects are the criteria of classification of urban space as shared resources among actors as indicated in Table 2.

In terms of data collection, this study applied semi-structured interviews and naturalistic observations of the daily work activities of the actors. This research also examined documents, particularly the local government laws, statistical reports, online reports, and news items relating to the pedicab drivers and street vendors in Yogyakarta.

Snowball sampling strategies were applied to identify appropriate participants for the interviews due to the difficulties of accessing the target population of informal tourism economy actors (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Heckathorn, 2002). In total, 47 informal economy actors were interviewed, consisting of 26 pedicab drivers and 21 street vendors. Interviews generally ranged from 40 to 60 minutes in length and were conducted in the field to reduce the disruption to participants. All interviews were recorded and notes were taken. Interviews were undertaken in Bahasa (Indonesia's official language) by a native speaker and transcribed verbatim. Interviews ceased when data saturation was achieved for each case (Marshall, 1996; Uriely & Belhassen, 2006).

Content analysis of the interviews, as well as written notes from observations and document analysis were undertaken using NVivo 9.2 and were used to assist in managing raw data including coding and creating memos in English. This software allows searching, exploring, and linking patterns of data and ideas (Bazeley & Richards, 2000; Richards, 1999). Further, in order to reduce the bias in interpreting data (Hall & Valentin, 2005), this research applied two main strategies to overcome this issue. Firstly, simultaneous interviews and observation are applied during data collection (Jennings, 2010; Yin, 2009). Participant

Table 2. Typologies of space within a destination

	Formal economy	Informal economy		Visitors
Types of space	Private space	Group space Semi-private space	Common pool resources	Common pool resources

clarification of findings was carried out in both interviews and observations. Thus, during the interviews, questions were asked that derived from the participant's previous answer as well as the results of observation. Secondly, thick description of each case was provided in the analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) including the types of services and products sold, history, and location of business. This thick description is also the mean to analyse the attributes of the community/actors as one of external factors in the IAD Framework.

3.1 Case 1: pedicab drivers

The pedicab, one of the traditional transportation mode in Yogyakarta, has been transformed into a tourist transport service; *becak wisata*, meaning pedicab for tourism activities. The economic crisis, political instability, and threats to personal safety that occurred in the late 1990s impacted negatively on the number of tourists to Indonesia (Purwanto, 2006). This in turn affected the livelihoods of pedicab drivers, and competition among them increased significantly. Consequently, in order to gain more passengers, they began to seek out guests more proactively and to exert more influence over the trip itinerary. For example, they began taking tourists to shops where they had the best commission arrangements so that the trip would be more profitable for them. This behaviour eventually led to tourist dissatisfaction and began to negatively affect the image of Yogyakarta as a tourism destination (Damayanti, Ruhanen, & Scott, 2011; van Yogja, 2011).

In response, the local government and other local institutions attempted to reorganise the pedicab drivers more formally. The local government acknowledged eight separate pedicab unions which were based on their association with particular shops or accommodation (van Gemert et al., 1999) or connected to key attractions such as the Sultan Palace (*Kraton*). As a result, the pedicab drivers within the union had a specific place to park their pedicabs and attract passengers.

3.2 Case 2: street vendors

The street vendors studied in this research are located in Malioboro Street, a well-known tourist attraction in Yogyakarta. Malioboro Street is a shopping area and is lined with street vendors who sell various goods and services such as foods, art, and souvenirs (Putri, 2009; Timothy & Wall, 1997). The street vendors in Malioboro are generally family businesses working shifts during the day and at night (Timothy & Wall, 1997). In 2013 more than 2400 street vendors were found to be working in Malioboro Street (Widiyanto, 2013).

Until the mid-1980s such street vendors worked illegally. Later, the local government provided licenses to these street vendors in order to better manage the space and maintain a positive image for one of the major tourist attractions in Yogyakarta (Putri, 2009; Timothy & Wall, 1997). A licence provides the street vendor with the right to operate their stall in a certain location for a certain period during the day. These street vendors formed vendors' associations or unions to coordinate their activities, represent them in legal discussions with the municipal government, and provide savings and loans services for their members (Timothy & Wall, 1997). The unions of street vendors usually represent vendors with similar products or vendors that are co-located (i.e. in a row). The first street vendors association, the *Tridarma* Union formed in 1987. Nowadays, 10 similar street vendor unions exist in this area and vary in membership from 10 to 800 (Putri, 2009).

Four unions of pedicab drivers and street vendors were selected for further study. The selection was based on three criteria including: the actors should have interaction with other informal economy actors, the unions represent different types of goods sold, locations and trading times, and union members were accessible for data collection.

4. Findings

4.1 Interactions among the informal actors

The informal actors in the case studies were found to engage in coopetition; that is, behaviour and interactions simultaneously cooperative and competitive (Damayanti et al., 2017). In their daily activities, pedicab drivers compete to gain passengers but may cooperate when serving a group (more than the capacity of an individual pedicab) of passengers. Here, cooperation occurs as actors share customers (the resource) with other actors. Similarly, street vendors compete to gain customers but will cooperate when a transaction is for a large quantity of goods (beyond the capacity of one vendor). As one pedicab driver discussed,

> Every day we try to find passengers in here. If there is a group of tourists visiting this area, each of us will try to approach them, first come first chance. However, we will count the numbers of tourists within this group. If there are six tourists, then only three pedicab drivers will try to approach them; the next drivers who come will move back. Then, these three drivers will try to make a good deal with this group of tourists. Jointly, they will serve the tourists. [PD0201]

On the other hand, these actors also demonstrated a pattern of simultaneous coopetition. For example, the actors will compete to gain passengers/customers, while at the same time cooperating to maintain the positive ambiance and cleanliness of the shared space.

> I always try to arrange my goods in an attractive way, so the customers can recognise that I have quite a lot of options, not only the styles but also the quantity. [SV0301]

> We bought garbage bins and brooms. Although we have already hired cleaners, we want to support the cleanliness of this place. We want to ensure all of us, including the other street vendors who share this area, can do their business comfortably. A clean business area can attract more customers. [SV0102]

Union membership also influences the extent to coopetition among the informal actors. Union membership is based on location (co-located street vendors or pedicab drivers servicing particular key tourist attractions) and each union's members will operate in their respective locations. The union rules as to who can operate in certain areas were discussed by one pedicab driver as follows:

> There is a specific area that only our union's members can approach and acquire passengers … If we find non-union member(s) in this area we will ask him/them to get out of here. [PD0301]

Two main factors were found to influence coopetition among the actors in both cases. First, the actors will consider the benefit gained from coopetition, either the individual or mutual benefits. In terms of cooperation activities, they will apply fairness in sharing benefits as a rule of cooperation. This leads to the second factor, that the actor will consider the other actor's credibility as a fair and trustworthy collaborator

before cooperating. An actor will cooperate with another if he believes that they are trustworthy; that the actor will compete fairly according to the rules and will not attempt to cheat them in the course of the interaction. However, the restriction of an actor to a particular space limits which other actors they can deal with. In situations where another actor is untrustworthy, two options are possible: avoid cooperative situations with untrustworthy actors or cooperate with untrustworthy actors despite the outcome in order to minimise conflict.

> In this cooperation, usually our customers give the money to the other vendors who sell the food. Sometimes, this vendor thinks that he/she has already given money to me, but I cannot recall it. So, in order to reduce conflict among us, I make a note of the kind and amount of drink that I serve for the other vendor's customers. At the end of the day, I will ask him/her to pay for these drink based on my note. [SV0202]

4.2 Interactions between formal and informal actors

This research also highlights the co-location interactions of the formal and informal actors in a tourist destination. In these cases, the formal actors refer to the attractions and formal stores in the destination. Firstly, in the situation when formal and informal actors can provide complementary products, the informal actors support the formal economy. This is illustrated by the pedicab drivers who are located in the parking lots or entrance of an attraction and support the formal economy by providing a service that moves visitors from one attraction to the others. The food street vendors also support the formal actors, particularly their employees by providing food.

> At that moment, I approached a car that had just entered the North Square for parking. I tried to make a deal with the passengers of this car; they were a family [parents with two children]. They wanted to visit the Horse Carriage Museum, Kraton, and Water Castle. [PD0105]

A competitive situation emerges when both formal and informal actors provide similar types of goods; then the informal economy becomes a competitor of the formal economy. This situation can be seen with the street vendors in Malioboro Street who sell handicrafts and cloths that are also sold in the formal stores. However, in response, formal and informal actors seek to service different types of buyers in order to prevent direct and fierce competition between the two.

In both the complementing and competing situations, the formal actors generally express concern about informal economy when they obstruct visitors from entering the attractions/stores by overcrowding the parking lots or entrances. So not to jeopardise their place in these shared spaces, the informal actors respond by organise themselves and maintaining the neatness and cleanness of their parking lots and stalls. In the case of the street vendors, these actors also need to take into account the design and visibility of the formal shops as the informal stallholders cannot obstruct the view of the formal storefronts. Hence, the local government enacted formal regulations to limit the maximum size of street vendor stalls.

> We have to obey the Mayor's Decree on the size of our stalls in Malioboro Street. Based on the decree, the maximum length and high of our stall is 1, 5 m. Some of us need to adjust [reduce] the size, particularly the high, in order to prevent conflict with the formal store located in front of our stalls. [SV0301]

4.3 Typologies of space for the informal tourism economy

The informal tourism economy space refers to the places where informal actors interact with each other and with the formal economy to service visitors. This space is a shared resource among all actors in the economy and the way that actors use the space influences other actors' access to this resource and impacts upon their own behaviours. Three types of informal tourism economy spaces were identified.

4.3.1 The public space as a common pool resource

The first type of a public space is a common pool resource where all actors have the right to access and use the space, and an individual actor's activities may obstruct other users from benefiting from the space. Informal actors share the space with other informal and formal actors, visitors, and local residents.

The issue of informal actors occupying public spaces is a concern of the local government, particularly as the number of actors attempting to service tourists is often greater than the available space. Competition for space in tourist places means that actors who miss out on the allocated spaces may then occupy other public space and disturb other users. Hence, policies are enacted by local government to prohibit informal actors from occupying public spaces to ensure that visitors, as well as the urban inhabitants, can use the public space conveniently.

4.3.2 The public space as a group/collective good

The second type is a group or collective space where drivers or vendors from only a particular union have an exclusive right to access the urban public space. This right is defined by the union membership of the driver or vendor. Based on the types of goods sold, and the interactions among the actors, two types of group spaces are evident in the case of street vendors (see Figure 1). Type A is the shared space of two or more vendors from the same union (same type of products) where the interaction among these actors includes competing and cooperating to gain customers, maintaining a positive ambiance in this space, and looking after one another's stall when required. On the other hand, in Type B, two or more vendors from different unions are located in geographical proximity and their interactions are based on product differences. These street vendors compete to gain customers as well as cooperate by complementing their products.

4.3.3 The public space as semi-private goods

Urban public spaces as semi-private goods are a particular situation illustrated by the street vendors in Malioboro Street. This is based on the right to use the same space for certain vendors. The space is a semi-private good as the space can only be used by another vendor if the vendor who usually uses it is not available. However, the space is actually a public space (such as a pedestrian path) and so the vendor has no rights to the space as such. The right to use the space rests with the government who impose formal regulations that specifies space, trading times, and size of stalls street vendors in Yogyakarta, particularly those in Malioboro Street. The local government act also requires street vendors in Malioboro Street to have a license to use the location (*Surat Izin Penggunaan Lokasi Pedagang Kakilima*). Vendors without a licence are considered to be illegal vendors.



Figure 1. Types of space in the case of street vendors

The condition that another vendor may use this space when it is vacant is based on an informal agreement among the street vendors. The space may be used by another vendor who needs additional space for their business or a non-union member vendor or a vendor without a licence. This agreement is premised on providing an opportunity for other vendors, particularly those without a licence, to benefit from the space. The temporary vendor is expected to obey the formal regulation about the sizes and times to operate the stall, as well as the norms among the vendors to maintain the positive ambiance in the space.

5. Discussion and conclusions

The space provided to informal tourism economy actors is a significant factor in the delivery of their goods or services. Previous research on the informal economy has mainly discussed space from a legal perspective (Batréau & Bonnet, 2016; Boonjubun, 2017; Brown, 2015; Schindler, 2014). This research instead explores the space occupied by informal economy actors by applying the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and the concept of actors' interaction and shared resources (Ostrom, 2005b, 2011). Actors' interaction in the informal economy is seen as involving coopetition (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Damayanti et al., 2017; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997; Tsai, 2002), and the findings from this empirical research provide insights for the informal sector in other developing countries, and a basis for further exploration and comparison.

In Yogyakarta, informal tourism economy actors undertake coopetitive behaviours, both with formal actors and other informal actors. This coopetition is based on the attributes of the actors particularly on the types of goods and services sold: complementary or supplementary, as well as the location and time of interaction. The patterns of interaction can be simultaneous and/or sequential (Belleflamme & Neysen, 2009; Galvagno & Garraffo, 2010; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Kylänen & Rusko, 2010; Wang & Krakover, 2008) based on the biophysical condition, particularly the number of the shared resources, either single or multiple (Damayanti et al., 2017). Furthermore, the actors use formal

regulations and norms among themselves to minimise conflicts that might occur as the result of these interactions.

This research has found that based on the rules in use including formal regulations, norms, and action situation/interactions among informal economy actors, the public spaces can be characterised into three types; common pool resource, collective pool resource, or semi-private resource. First, public space is a common pool resource where the actors share the space with the other informal actors, visitors, and residents. Overcrowding by informal actors may lead them to be excluded from the space. If, however, the public space is transformed into a collective/group space through local government regulation(s) and trading is allowed then it becomes a collective good or collective pool resource (Brown, 2015). In such space two or more co-located actors from the same or different union(s) gain customers/passengers using coopetitive behaviours. Third, in the case of street vendors, the space has become a semi-private space where this space is exclusively used by a certain vendor; although the vendor has no right to sell the space. The typologies of space for the informal tourism economy are evident in the implementation of inclusive urban policies related to the informal economy. Further, norms among the informal actors have implications for the characteristics of urban public spaces as part of urban commons (Foster & Iaione, 2015; Garnett, 2012; Huron, 2017; O'Brien, 2012).

This study has made three key contributions in terms of managing the urban public space in an informal economy context. Firstly, in terms of the property rights of the urban public space (Harvey, 2012; Webster, 2007) this study emphasises the existence of collective rights over a public space by the informal economy (Brown, 2015). In order to negotiate their rights with the local government, the informal economy actors may establish an association or union (Fajana, 2008; Peña, 1999). As a result, the local government allocate public spaces for the use of certain unions. Furthermore, this research found that an actor located in a semi-private space might hold individual property rights over this trading place. Although the right is not tradable, the actor has exclusive right to access and use the space. These rights can attract the informal economy actors into a designated space where the local government can then allocate space for the actors. Further exploration of the benefits of a semi-private space on its holder, the implications of this (individual) property right on coopetitive behaviours among actors, as well as the existence of this type of space in other cases should be explored further.

Secondly, conflict among actors in a public space has previously been acknowledged (van Rensburg & Doherty, 2006) but this current research found evidence of coopetitive behaviours among actors to reduce such conflict. The actors will not only consider the individual benefit gained from competition but also the mutual benefit from cooperation. In cooperating to maintain positive ambiance within a shared public space, the informal actors also seek to minimise conflicts with legal authorities and the formal actors. Further, this effort can prolong the existence of the informal economy actors in a tourism destination as well as promote the image of the destination that can attract more visitors or potential customers for the informal economy. This research also provides empirical evidence that cooperative management of the urban commons can arise organically (Garnett, 2012; Ostrom, 1990) among informal tourism economy actors. This suggests the need for further research to examine the process of cooperative management among the actors in a destination, particularly among informal actors.

The third contribution relates to the need for shared norms for commons management (Foster & Iaione, 2015; Garnett, 2012; Orozco-Quintero & Davidson-Hunt, 2009; Ostrom, 1990, 2010). This research illustrated the co-existence of group/union's norms as the informal institutions and formal regulations for managing the economic activities of the actors in the informal economy. Such norms govern individual behaviours and the formal regulations dictate the allocation of working space and trading times. These norms reduce the conflicts with other actors including formal economy service providers and the local government. Further examination of the norms that actors use in managing an urban public space is warranted.

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PAGE 1

PAGE 2

PAGE 3

PAGE 4

PAGE 5

PAGE 6

PAGE 7

PAGE 8

PAGE 9

PAGE 10

PAGE 11

PAGE 12

PAGE 13

PAGE 14

PAGE 15

PAGE 16

PAGE 17

PAGE 18