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Combating Corruption during Democratic Transition: The Role of CSOs in South Korea and Indonesia

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Abstract Corruption is a strong constraint for economic growth and development for emerging democratic countries. Corruption has commonly deeply entrenched, while political structures usually are very complicated, making the government less capable to deal with the problem. This stipulates civil society to stand up organizing anti-corruption movement. This paper attempts to describe how civil society organizations (CSOs) in South Korea and Indonesia play an important role in combating corruption during democratic transition. Apart from being successful in stimulating public awareness regarding the problem, the CSOs also fruitfully initiated a number of strategic policies led to the enactment of institutional and legal frameworks. They are also able to hold state officials accountable and brought the corrupt ones to justice. Their works have improved accountability in the governmental system. Although generally, CSOs in both countries share some similarities, there are some differences on the way they organize the movement. CSOs in Korea generally have stronger membership ties than their counterparts in Indonesia.

Keywords Anti-corruption, Social Movement, Governance, Civil Society Organizations, Democratization, Economic Development

1. Introduction

Despite having different finding regarding its effects, academic literature generally agree that corruption is a strong constraint for economic growth and development [22, 27]. Indeed, there are some who argue that under certain circumstances corruption may help economic development by allowing private sector agents to evade burdensome regulations, reducing business uncertainty and making possible higher rate of investment [13, 18]. However, general investigation found that corrupt practices in management of public resources reduces the government's ability to provide sound public services, including investment, health,

educational and social welfare, which are important for the achievement of economic development [1, 10, 22]. Also, the prevalence of corruption creates discrimination in access to public services by favouring those who are able to influence the authorities to act in their personal interest, by providing bribes and kickbacks. The common people suffer disproportionately from its consequences, because they are particularly unable to get fair access to public good.

In democratic transition countries, the problem even more complicated since political disarray could unquestionably provide fertile atmosphere for the expansion of corruption [22]. Not surprisingly, rampant corruption committed by state officials has encouraged people in these countries for actively engaged in efforts to eradicate corruption [9, 17]. They bind themselves in civil society organizations to combat corruption communally so that they have more power as a counterweight of the state [17].

Similar to other democratic transition countries, during the last decades, both the people of South Korea and Indonesia have also struggled to address the problem of corruption that has been severe in their governance structures. It was corruption that made the people in both countries to move for subverting the power of the military regime when they were weakened by the economic crisis in the late 1990s, which then led to democratization.

Indeed, historically, South Korea and Indonesia share some similarities. Both gained independence from Japanese occupation following World War II (Indonesia in 1945 and Korea 1948). Then the two countries were ruled by authoritarian national heroes and who were instrumental in fighting for independence for the two aforementioned countries respectively. Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Sukarno in Indonesia. The history of the two countries continued with the emergence of an authoritarian military regime. General Park Chung-hee took over Rhee's government in South Korea, while General Suharto overthrew Sukarno in Indonesia. Then, after more than three decades in power, the military regime in the two countries collapsed. Korea and Indonesia embraced the era of democratic government in the late 1990s. Corruption has

been a major reason that caused the fall of the military regimes. The people's power broke out in both countries spearheaded by students and academics at various universities.

Following the collapse of the respective military government, in the attempt to eradicate corruption, the people of South Korea and Indonesia, formed hundreds of anti-corruption organization, trying to inflame anti-corruption sentiments through various means and networks. Civil society organizations (CSOs) then played an important role in uncovering and taking corruption issues into the public domain and made a number of impressive achievements. They have been successful in bringing corrupt state officials to court, which has resulted in a prison sentence. In addition, the role of CSOs is not limited to acting as a 'watchdog' for the government, but also includes the initiation of a number of strategic policies. Under the influence of CSOs, a number of institutional and legal framework to combat corruption were established.

What is the actual picture of the work of CSOs in fighting corruption? How they emerge and drive? This article will provide answers by comparing the activities undertaken by the CSOs. In particular, this article describes the work in situations of democratic transition taking place in both countries.

This article argues that although CSOs have done a much similar thing, nevertheless the achievements obtained showed different results. Indonesia is still left behind Korea in some monitoring indicators of corruption. Judging from the Corruption Perception Index record, for example, Indonesia is still much worse compared to Korea. In 2015, the Indonesia record was 36 (in the ranking of 88 of 168 countries surveyed), while South Korea was 56 (rank 37). This raises the question regarding the differences of both countries on the way they deal with corruption.

Although the role of CSOs is only part of the overall strategy to eradicate corruption, the insight regarding CSOs' contribution is important in identifying the points that may stimulate effectiveness in dealing with corruption.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Democratization and Corruption

During the last two decades, corruption has emerged as one of the main concerns of the international community. Anti-corruption programs have been attached in the national development agenda as well as the international donor aid package. Many countries have signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) since its formulation in 2004. Public concerns about corruption are growing due to its impacts that seriously damaged their interests in political environment, economic and social change throughout the world and also because of the gradual recognition by the academic community regarding the

negative impacts of corruption on the effectiveness of economic, social and political development [34, 35].

With the increasing awareness of the dangers of corruption, since the 1990s, governments and international agencies seek effective measures to control this global threat. Many studies have been conducted to find effective approaches to solving corruption. A wide range of knowledge has been accumulated in terms of a possible approach [13, 17].

In third world countries, where authoritarian regimes used to utilize corruption (as well as manipulative elections) as the way to maintain power, democratization is often considered as a panacea to tackle acute corruption. During the despotic government, the rulers usually maintain the unfair allocation of public resources, impose rents and extortion, execute law enforcement by reverse (those in power are above the law), and exploit state institutions for the enrichment of a minute few in the society. Not surprisingly, people power movement emerged in Asia, Africa and Latin American to force down authoritarian regimes due to people dissatisfaction related to the chronic corruption [13, 17, 18].

The democratization following the end of authoritarian regimes, however, does not automatically form clean and capable governments. On the contrary, the situation may get worse since the new democratic governments are generally inexperienced to exercise the power, and in fact, they are also tainted with corruption [22, 32]. Theoretically, democratization should led to a cleaner government since public resources previously enjoyed by patronage, collusion, and nepotism is distributed more evenly and relatively equal. However, democratic political competition does not by itself counteract corruption. New democracies very rarely achieve fair governance because they generally failed to push the predatory elite to comply with the allocation of public resources that is based on ethical universalism, including equality before the law and the impartial treatment of all citizens by the government. This condition could led to frustration and disappointment of ordinary people as they may consider that democratization did not make any change. On the contrary, democracy produces a new cohort of corrupt office holders. This situation could eventually delegitimize the whole democratic system [1].

Not surprisingly, the government's inability to tackle corruption then prompted civil society in several countries to step up the attempt to fight corruption [7, 32]. Indonesia and South Korea are not exception in both countries the people have formed hundreds of anti-corruption organizations, which since the 1990s has been trying to inflame anti-corruption through various means and networks.

2.2. CSO and the Movement against Corruption

Anti-corruption struggle basically is an inclusive national strategy to reduce corruption and it quickly became a comprehensive strategy to formulate measures to increase transparency and accountability of government. Some

countries (such as Australia, for example) undertake an anti-corruption strategy that was not directly through repression, but rather to promote a broader effort to improve transparency and accountability [20]. In contrast to the policy of national anti-corruption strategy that explicitly labeled "anti-corruption", measures such integrity may look more implicit because they are embedded into the system of governance and justice reform program. In other words, the prevalence of corruption could be reduced by good governance.

Theoretically, governance is the way public officials and public institutions acquire and exercise authority to provide public goods and services, including basic services, infrastructure, and a healthy investment climate. To make it good, each actor in setting governance must be accountable for the authority and the power they have in the mechanism prescribed by law and other regulations. Various entry points can be seen in relation to the two dimensions of accountability, namely vertical accountability (by which political leaders must be held accountable to citizens through electoral channels and civil society monitoring) and horizontal accountability (by which several government agencies supervise, control, and impose sanctions on other government agencies within the government administrative system) [25].

In line with this notion, a "principal-agent" theory postulated the existence of "principal" that supervise "agents" and are assumed to have the interest to fight corruption. So good governance programs are usually directed to the "principal" (ministries, regulatory agencies, and anti-corruption agencies), which is considered morally above corruption. Unfortunately, those who have the most discretionary powers have the greatest chance of being corrupt. They put high-level government officials and legislators to manipulate the legal institutions or to influence policy and legislation that favors certain interest groups. As a result, more often than not, "principal" is actually functioning as a protector or guard door to crimes of corruption, or even as the main actor of corruption [25].

Therefore, in order to establish effective control and supervision of these officials, the people should mobilize themselves at the grassroots level in which citizens participate and actively supervise officials continuously. Ordinary citizens should be able to play the role of "principle". Indeed, in the end, this is the arena in which the predatory elite can be revised through the collective action of the people who move as the civil society [7, 8].

In line with this notion, the experience of many countries shows that the anti-corruption strategy is more effective to implement when they were spotted in the wider context of national development initiatives, including participation of the people. This integration into the national development

plan has been proven as an effective way to encourage cross-agency cooperation from the beginning and avoid a narrow approach in promoting human development [24].

Since the last two decades, experts started to discuss efforts of corruption eradication by linking it with the concept and role of "civil society," "moral values," "culture" and also "public participation" to idealize a comprehensive step of collective action. This fits to the view that fighting corruption is not just the domain of state institutions. At the same time, awareness of the importance of collective action has increased in the discourse of community development, but many approaches and ideas are still mutually disconnected from each other, from one theory to another [ibid 24].

In order to rectify this problem, in 2001 the World Bank published a special document of the World Development Report that attempts to conceptualize the ideas of "social accountability"[33]. Following the initiative, other agencies such as UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), USAID (United States Agency for International Development), DFID (Department for International Development, British Government), and George Soros Open Society Institute, began to support world-wide civil society groups and the media to voice anti-corruption as a top priority of their good governance program. They promoted the establishment of Transparency International with branches in more than 100 countries to channel funds for anti-corruption initiatives and creating an anti-corruption CSO community on an international scale [17].

CSO is seen to have great potential in improving accountability mechanisms and can significantly contribute to efforts to combat corruption. CSOs may take on a more prominent role when formal accountability system is not working properly. CSOs can contribute to stimulating the formulation of effective power relations between the state and its citizens (increasing the vertical dimension of accountability). Although the functions carried out by CSOs is informal, but the impact will be significant when they are well organized.

More specifically, in the process of reforms to improve accountability and anti-corruption protocols, CSOs can function on two levels: strategic and practical [17, 31].

At the strategic level, by supporting policy reforms to strengthen the mechanism of checks and balances between state institutions. CSOs can play this role by contributing to the creation of anti-corruption policies and institutional frameworks to fight corruption.

At the practical level, by controlling state actors through mobilization of the people in the battle against corruption. CSOs can play this role by encouraging citizen to monitor state agencies and engage them in demanding policy reform.

Table 1. Civil society activities for anti-corruption reform

Strategic level	Practical level
Initiating codes of conduct for public officials and declaration of assets; pushing for decentralization and deregulation; demanding the establishment of anti-corruption bodies; carrying surveys on corruption; conducting public hearings and referenda on drafts, decrees, regulations, laws; ensuring freedom of the press by prohibiting censorship and encouraging diversity of media ownership; promoting high-quality political competition through free and fair election; public education.	Corruption inquiries; raising public awareness; elevating standards and public expectations of state performance; monitoring the performance of arms of law (police, auditors, ombudsman, judges, attorneys, public prosecutors); publishing investigations report; conducting capacity building for anti-corruption stakeholders; organizing class actions; protecting whistle blowers; ensuring public access to government information; requiring transparency in government; monitoring government performance in areas such as large-scale public procurement bidding; using new web-based tools on the internet for transparency, disclosure, public participation and dissemination of information; piloting anti-corruption programs.

Source: [31]

3. Material and Methods

The research questions and research objectives are as follow:

3.1. Research Questions

This study answered the question of how the similarities and differences in the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia and South Korea in terms of:

- 1) the origin of the movement;
- 2) the driving actors;
- 3) methods of movement;
- 4) the effect of the movement against the political system.

3.2. Research Objectives

This study examines three objectives:

- 1) To identify the processes involved, the characteristics of the civil society movement, programs, priorities and strategies that have been used to combat corruption;
- 2) To identify constraints and limitations they face to face this problem, and
- 3) To know the influence of CSOs' movement in strengthening the accountability and consolidate democracy.

3.3. Data Collection Methods

The primary research data was acquired through literature and also in depth-interviews with various informants who were supposedly know the topic of the research. In South Korea, we interviewed the leaders and activists of Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), as well as the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD).

Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the researchers undertaken interviews with activists of Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) and the Forum for Budget Transparency (FITRA). In addition, we also interviewed officers of *Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission* (ACRC) Korea, and members of Indonesia Anti Corruption Commission (KPK). The informants were taken by using purposive method.

4. Funding and Analysis

4.1. Economic Development, Democratization & Corruption

South Korea and Indonesia share several similarities in their history. Both spinning in sequences that are sometimes contradictory from one period of time to another, having a civilian government once they got independence from Japanese colonial rule, then fell into authoritarian military regime, and then embrace democratic government. When under the military regime, both countries also implemented centralistic economic development strategy and were named amongst the Asian tigers following their impressive economic growth [3].

Due to such strategy, South Korea today has transformed itself into a developed country. The economy grows along with the rise of electronic and automotive giant companies such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai-Kia in the 21st century. The military government, which was pioneered by General Park Chung-hee, controlled and implemented economic development that was structured in a centralized planning scheme. The implementation of national development during the Park era and his successors however were marred by numerous violations of human rights. People lands were seized by the government for the benefit of large projects, the press were restricted, while many journalists, opposition leaders, and students were arrested, imprisoned, and tortured without a fair trial when they criticized the government [12, 16] In addition, concessions and preferential economic policies granted to limited numbers of entrepreneurs projected to become conglomerates (*chaebol*). Corruption was rampant and this led to social unrest and economic fragility. Not surprisingly, there were numerous violence demonstrations against the government during military era. Furthermore, with a huge power in their hand, law enforcement agencies in Korea generally plunged into the disoriented function of liability from pursuing law enforcement objective to merely protecting the rulers [27]. Police and prosecutors in Korea, for example, prioritize the interests of government and *chaebol* in litigants against the people. Violations of the law were easily compromised by money, on the grounds of "for the sake of the country". Legal

institutional apparatus could be easily interfered by the executive authorities, especially the president when they are undertaking their jobs (see for example [16, 27]).

This situation stimulated the emergence of larger popular protests to put an end to the military regime in 1992. The era of military rule was replaced by democracy when Kim Young-sam was elected as the first civilian president and served a single five years, that led to a massive anti-corruption campaign and the subsequent arrest of two of his predecessors on charges of corruption. Kim also gave amnesty to thousands of political prisoners and eliminated criminal charges against pro-democracy protesters who had been arrested during the Gwangju massacre¹.

Part of his campaign was demanding government and military officials to publish their financial records. The anti-corruption campaign that he waged also included attempts to reform the domination of the chaebol, South Korea's major conglomerates that dominate the economy. Unfortunately, Kim also had alleged numerous allegations of corruption that involved his son and several members of his family, which led to loss of confidence of the people to his party in the election of 1996. Kim Young-sam was replaced consecutively by other civilian presidents, which unfortunately could not also avoid the issue of corruption been tainted with their respective governments. Kim's successor, Roh Moo-hyun, for example, previously a leader of human rights and anti-corruption activists suffered a tragic fate for allegedly accepting bribes by prosecutors and this led to his suicide [16].

All in all, South Korea's success in building its economy coupled with the issue of corruption. The economic policy has remarkably contributed to the national development, but at the same time collusion between politicians and big business has led to rampant corruption, both during the period of authoritarian rule and democracy. Corruption is so bad and rife that some of the presidents who launched the program of anti-corruption were also subsequently charged with corruption. Despite various laws and regulations made to fight corruption, corruption scandals continue to occur in the government resulting in reduced levels of public confidence.

The history of democratic transition and corruption of South Korea is not much different with the Indonesian experience. Similar to South Korea, Indonesia's modern history began with independence from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Then, for twenty years, Indonesia Soekarno-led civil administration had not been able to make significant progress in the economic field. The reins of governance were taken over by a military regime under General Suharto in 1966, who then ruled the country for a 32 year period.

He implemented the practice of a monopolistic economy in the hand of an iron triangle: his family, Chinese tycoons and military generals [30]. Similar with South Korea, the military regime undertook a variety of economic development initiatives based on focusing on a handful of conglomerates. This policy led to hydra-headed corruption and a discontent citizenry. The Suharto's family, in particular, had taken up direct and a dominant position in business. Their business empire was estimated to be worth up to US\$ 7 billion [30]. The durability of Suharto's regime was ensured by his remarkable political skill to control subordinates by distributing patronage [2].

Due to this situation, along with the fact that Suharto had held to power for almost 32 years, the public considered that Suharto was too old and incapable of sustaining his presidency. These became the main reason for the emergence of the people's power (*reformasi*) movement to bring down President Suharto in 1998. The people demanded to clean up corruption, collusion, and nepotism in governmental agencies [4].

However, despite democratic transition process that followed, corruption in various governmental positions persist. Democratization might transform rules of the game, but Indonesian governance still operates with the old machinery – including bureaucracy and judicial institutions that retain their power with corrupt practices since the new politicians have less initiative to hold them to account. Despite 17 years of democratization, in 2016 Transparency International ranked Indonesia 88th out of 168 countries in its annual survey of Corruption Perception Index (CPI). This rank is worse than India, China and four of the ten countries belonging to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

¹ The Gwangju Massacre or Uprising, and also known as Gwangju Democratization Movement, was a popular uprising in the city of Gwangju, from 18 – 27 May, 1980. Some estimate that more than 606 people may have died. During this period, Gwangju citizens angrily took up arms (by robbing police stations) when government troops killed a Jeonnam University student – who were demonstrating against the Chun Doo-hwan government. Following the riot, a number of activists were then arrested and jailed by the government.

Table 2. CPI Records of South Korea and Indonesia

Country	Year Score													
	'95	'97	'99	'01	'03	'05	'07	2009	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
South Korea	4.3	4.3	3.8	4.2	4.3	5.0	5.1	5.5	5.4	56	55	55	56	52
Indonesia	1.9	2.7	1.7	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.8	3.0	32	32	34	36	37

Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org)

4.2. CSOs Movement against Corruption

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in South Korea and Indonesia are powerful actors in the political life and anti-corruption movement. They even play a central role in initiating, encouraging, and making sure that the spirit of anti-corruption carried out by their government.

In South Korea, the civil society became strong and dynamic actors due to the role of prominent CSOs that significantly contributed to the people's power movement against the military regime since the early 1990s. They are able to promote and influence a wide range of significant political change that is well aligned with democratic movement. The growth of CSOs in South Korea are the direct fruit of the social movement organized by students from the era of authoritarian rule (1961-1987). Although the repression of the people by the military government at the time was very strong, South Korean social movements could develop a strong political tradition and even performing daredevil acts under the said authoritarian regimes. They kept undertaking courageous protests and public demonstrations against the government, even though the activists were arrested, imprisoned, and killed.

When democracy took place in 1987, opportunities for public participation expanded and was well utilized by the students by the setting up or joining a new civil society groups. They usually became loyal and disciplined members of the CSO in managing social movement. As a result, a large number of interest groups and CSOs grew during this period. A record from the Fair Trade Commission indicates there were more than 10,000 new CSOs (unions, industry associations, and NGOs) established in the first three years of democracy [16, 18].

Among the new organizations, two CSOs, namely CCEJ (Citizen Coalition for Economic Justice) and PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), emerged in the 1990s as prominent groups in the democratic era. Both organizations adopted a legal and peaceful movement model. Demonstrations and their actions were organized in a peaceful way that did not violate the law. In addition, they proposed alternative policy recommendations when criticizing government policies.

CCEJ was founded in 1989 by progressive academics and citizens to promote a more equitable society through 'the power of organized citizens'.² One of the substantial achievements CCEJ is its initiative in 1993 to push the

government to establish the "real name system" for all financial transactions and for property registration.³ This policy prevented the manipulation of transactions and land ownership, which is usually tainted with corruption. Since then, CCEJ activities has expanded to the field of environmental protection, democratic reform, and national reunification. Meanwhile, PSPD was formed in 1994 with a broad agenda to create a democratic society that can ensure people participation and human rights. PSPD marked its credential as a forefront civil society of South Korea after leading a successful campaign in 1998 for the rights of minority shareholders in the company's South Korean chaebol. PSPD often equated with foreign investors to demand more accountability from chaebol.⁴ Another main success is its boycott campaign against corrupt politicians in 2000 during the national assembly elections.

In 1996, both organizations along with a number of other CSOs initiated Fair Elections campaign. The campaign, focused on searching for the names of corrupt politicians and urged the Attorney General to take legal action. Despite the attempt, many politicians involved in corruption still won their respective elections. So the CSOs continued the fight. On January 12, 2000, as many as 412 CSOs formed General Election Solidarity (GES) movement. The movement was led by four major organizations: People Solidarity for participative Democracy (PSPD), the Korean Federation of Environmental Movement (KFEM), Korea Women Movement United (KWMU), and Green Korea United (GKU) who agreed to unite and work together to create a blacklist of politicians and held a series of public campaigns to fight them in all parts of Korea on general elections [33].

Also, apart from that, in 1999, CCEJ and PSPD joined several CSOs to establish the Congress Center Watch (CCW) to monitor the activities of the congress members. After auditing the MPs, members of the CCW published periodical reports, in which they announced the worst congressman. Unhappy members of Congress prohibited CSOs activists from attending public meetings in the congress room. Not infrequently, activists who kept trying to attend the sessions in the room were dragged out, but their resistance continued. They agreed further to engage in joint efforts and directly challenged political candidates in the general elections of 2000. CSO activists targeted certain candidates who were notably corrupt, and sensitized the public not to choose them.

² For full story of CCEJ history, see http://www.ccej.or.kr/index.php?mid=page_org_7&type=intro

³ Information provided by CCEJ activists during interview on the 2nd June 2015.

⁴ Information provided by PSPD activists during interview on the 3rd June 2015.

Both GES and CCW gained a widespread popular support after the activists launched an online campaign and dominated televised debates between members of GES and members of Congress during January 2000. The GES also spreaded major protests in six main cities. Another strategy that made the GES successful was the principle of non-violence which was officially declared on April 6th, 2000. The GES members were asked to strictly adhere to the principle of non-violence and accordingly attracted the sympathy and wide public support [33].

On April 8, 2000, when GES organized a rally with the theme "Go, Play, Vote, Change Festival", it is estimated that more than 50,000 people showed up expressing their support to the campaign [10]. The movement are able to organize such big rally since there are more than 800 CSOs that became the members of GES. The campaign ended on the day of the general elections on 13 April. Again, thousands of festival participants gathered in Myong Dong for the attendance of the dramatic closing ceremony. A leader of GES, Won Soon Park, delivered an impressive speech, entitled "I Have a Dream", to express his dream of a society which has a clear and transparent politics. On April 14th 2000, the election results showed that the campaign effectively convinced the voters, 59 out of the 86 blacklist candidates lost their chair. In addition, 15 of the 22 main targets were also not elected [10].

Due to this wide range of these activities, CSOs in Korea has an excellent reputation, strong political influence, and thus has great potential to offset the dominance of the state. CSO actors have become very progressive and successful in holding the state to account, despite the challenge of the legal and political environment that is relatively unresponsive. The scale and scope of activities of civil society is particularly impressive when compared with the more developed economies in East Asia such as Taiwan and Japan [16].

Why are the CSOs so powerful? One of possible answer for this question lies in the pattern of solid membership. They generally are able to form an effective movement since their independence in terms of funding is due to their ability to mobilize membership fees. PSPD, for example, has thousand active members. In 2015, it had 13,154 members who regularly pay dues, so as to collect revenue that runs into billions of KRW (Korean Won) annually, which contributes significantly to the total revenue of the organization.⁵ Similarly, CCEJ members reached approximately 25,000 active persons who pay fixed contributions every month.⁶

In addition, Korea CSOs' strength also lies in their ability to formulate movements that are directly related to the interests of their members. PSPD for example focuses on the economic democratization activities against the practice of crony capitalism and ask for the more equitable economic arrangement. Meanwhile, CCEJ focuses on the issue of fair

land ownership, so there are no fraud and mafia practices in the procurement of land for development projects and housing. These have been very advantageous for their members and causing high loyalty of the members to contribute to the organization.

The pattern of the CSOs' fight against corruption in Indonesia, also has similarities with what happened in South Korea. However, generally speaking, South Korea's CSOs have few steps more advanced than their counterparts in Indonesia.

In Indonesia, CSOs' fight against corruption arose from the ineffectiveness of the Suharto and post-Suharto governments in handling the problem. Although there are variations in the formation of anti-corruption CSOs, the process can best be described as moving from intermittent activities to institutionalized structures. Following the fall of Suharto, student activists institutionalized their informal associations into more formal, constructive and permanent anti-corruption CSOs in order to confront the corrupt practices of elite groups and prevent a recurrence of the undemocratic system. The driving factor for the anti-corruption campaign is the people's initiative to ensure the success of democratic consolidation and overcome the failure of the state in tackling corruption [31].

During the first decade of democratic era, the CSOs launched a wide area of anti-corruption activities, from the establishment of regulations to provide legal basis to combating corruption to the establishment of anti-corruption bodies. ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch, established in 1998), for example, typically re-examined the existing governance mechanisms and regulations in order to find out the spots that may support corruption, leading to the formulation of recommendations, which were then brought into public forums to attract support. By the inputs and supports of the public, the CSO delivered the proposal to parliament and other institutions for further legal processing. By making a huge coalition with other CSOs, ICW were successful to push the parliament for enacting law number 30/2002 on KPK (Anti-Corruption Commission) and the Special Court for Corruption. Following this achievement, the CSOs' coalition also actively participated in the formulation of law number 13/2006 on the witness and whistleblower protection act, and the establishment of supervisory institutions such as PPATK (Center for Financial Transactions Reporting and Analyses), KON (National Ombudsman Commission), KPPU (Commission for Supervisory Business Competition), KY (Judicial Commission), KK (Attorney General Commission), and Kompolnas (National Police Commission)⁷[31]. Meanwhile FITRA (Forum for Budget Transparency, founded in 1999) focuses their activities in scrutinizing government budget. FITRA fights for the fulfillment of people's rights to be involved in the entire budgeting process, from the process of

⁵ Information provided by PSPD activists during interview on the 3rd June 2015.

⁶ Information provided by CCEJ activists during interview on the 2nd June 2015.

⁷ Interview with the CSOs' activists on June and August 2015, see also <https://antikorupsi.org/>

drafting, parliamentary debate, execution, to the evaluation. Since its establishment FITRA has been actively involved in budget policy making at national and regional levels. It produces reports and analyses to push the government recognize the rights of the people when formulating budget.⁸

Additionally, apart from the participation in the law making processes and establishment of supervisory bodies, ICW and FITRA also actively reported corruption cases in multi levels of government structure, spread an anti-corruption attitude in Indonesian society, and demanded to recapture state assets that had sank deep into corruption. They had been the main actors in bringing corrupt officials to justice [31].

The effectiveness of CSOs in Indonesia to influence decision-making process has been determined by their ability to organize solid alliances, leading to the creation of a strong negotiating power by which they dealt with state institutions [31]. CSOs' alliances were formed both, temporarily during important moments of decision-making processes, and permanently in certain fields of work.

Furthermore, CSOs mobilized massive propaganda to generate public support through the mass media. Through press conferences, the opinions of CSO activists were frequently cited in newspapers and their ideas broadcasted on television and radios. CSO activists also used various public forums to send their messages. In addition, CSOs implemented a flexible combination of antagonistic and cooperative approaches in dealing with decision makers. When necessary, they launched constructive criticisms and demonstrations against politicians and bureaucrats, yet in other occasions, CSOs activists also worked hand in hand with policy makers to produce a legal/institutional framework and agenda that is necessary to curb corruption.

Unlike their counterparts in South Korean, the Indonesian CSOs, however, have not been able to develop strong membership for their survival. Financially, they still rely mainly on donors assistance to conduct activities, so that their independence is still in a question mark. In fact, ICW and FITRA are difficult to collect regular donation from their members.⁹ In this regard, the CSOs basically are problematical when determining agenda, and rather follow on donor-driven agenda. Moreover, the organization is typically organized by a limited number of activists who run the organizations for a long period of time with relatively weak orderliness of regeneration.

5. Conclusions

Despite democratization in the last two decades, South Korea and Indonesia remain embrace strong clientelistic culture, weak law enforcement, and bad accountability

mechanisms, and this has led to the continuation of corruption in these respective countries. This situation provides an opportunity for civil society organizations (CSOs) to undertake a central role in fighting corruption. In both countries, the CSOs, role in combating corruption is not limited to institutional supervision and abuse of power in the State sector, but also to support the smooth running of the chain of political accountability in the government system. In other words, the civil society can not only reduce the risk of corruption by external monitoring and dragging corrupt figures to trial but can also reduce the possibility of corruption by starting the reform of the law enforcement system and policy changes.

Although in general the trajectory emergence of civil society movements and organizations in both countries has some similarities, but there are some important aspects that makes a difference. CSOs in Korea, in general, has a stronger pattern of membership. They generally could be more independent since they have the ability to generate membership fees. On the contrary, CSOs in Indonesia, even though they have significant roles, are still unable to develop a strong membership and rely on donors funding to support their activities. This in turn, leaving a problem of accountability, regarding to whom they work, for CSOs in Indonesia.

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⁸ Interview with the CSOs' activists on June and August 2015, see also <http://seknasfitra.org/>.

⁹ Interview with the CSOs' activists on June and August 2015.

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